After Godel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK (2011)
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Abstract

Richard Tieszen presents an analysis, development, and defense of a number of central ideas in Kurt Gödel's writings on the philosophy and foundations of mathematics and logic. Tieszen structures the argument around Gödel's three philosophical heroes - Plato, Leibniz, and Husserl - and his engagement with Kant, and supplements close readings of Gödel's texts on foundations with materials from Gödel's Nachlass and from Hao Wang's discussions with Gödel. He provides discussions of Gödel's views, and develops a new type of platonic rationalism that requires rational intuition, called 'constituted platonism'.

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