Denying a Unified Concept of Disability

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (5):583-596 (2022)
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Abstract

This paper argues that there are reasons to believe that there is no single concept or category which demarcates all individuals who have a disability from those individuals who do not. The paper begins by describing that I call ‘a Unified Concept View of Disability’ and the role that such a view plays in debates about the nature of disability. After considering reasons to think that our concept of disability is not unified in the way that the Unified Concept View assumes, I outline what a non-unified approach to disability might look like. The paper concludes by considering implications of rejecting the Unified Concept View of disability.

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Kevin Timpe
Calvin College

Citations of this work

Defining Disability: Creating a Monster?Marissa D. Espinoza & Addison S. Tenorio - 2022 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (5):573-582.

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References found in this work

What good are our intuitions: Philosophical analysis and social kinds.Sally Haslanger - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):89-118.
What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
Realism and social structure.Elizabeth Barnes - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2417-2433.
The metaphysics of social kinds.Rebecca Mason - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):841-850.

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