Primitive Disclosive Alethism

Metaphysica 8 (1):1-15 (2007)
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Abstract

The contemporary debate about truth is polarized between deflationists and those who offer robust accounts of truth. I present a theory of truth called ‘Primitive Disclosive Alethism’ that occupies the middle ground between these two extremes. Contrary to deflationist claims, truth has a nature beyond its merely linguistic, expressive function. Truth is objective and non-epistemic, yet cannot be characterized in terms of correspondence. Primitive Disclosive Alethism offers a metaphysically satisfying explanation of our correspondence intuitions, while explaining why the concept of truth is an undefined primitive. The theory also explains why the T-schema offers the clearest expression of what makes a sentence true. I distinguish this theory from the Identity Theory of Truth which equates true propositions with facts

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Timothy Nulty
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth

Citations of this work

Pluralism and the absence of truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
Is Truth Primitive?Jeremy Wyatt - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1281-1304.

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References found in this work

Being and time.Martin Heidegger - 1962 - New York,: Harper.
Thought and talk.Donald Davidson - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan, Mind and language. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 1975--7.
The second person.Donald Davidson - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):255-267.
Philosophical Papers.John Langshaw Austin (ed.) - 1961 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.

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