The Dialectic Role of the Flickers of Freedom

Philosophical Studies 131 (2):337-368 (2006)
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Abstract

One well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples is the ‘flicker-of-freedom strategy’. The flicker strategy claims that even in a Frankfurt-style counterexample, there are still morally relevant alternative possibilities. In the present paper, I differentiate between two distinct understandings of the flicker strategy, as the failure to differentiate these two versions has led some philosophers to argue at cross-purposes. I also explore the respective dialectic roles that the two versions of the flicker strategy play in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Building on this discussion, I then suggest a reason why the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate has reached a stalemate.

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Kevin Timpe
Calvin College

Citations of this work

Source incompatibilism and the foreknowledge dilemma.Tina Talsma - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.

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References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.

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