Why I Am Not a Moral Relativist (and Neither Are You)

In Disputed Moral Issues: A Reader, 5th ed. Oxford University Press. pp. 41-48 (2019)
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Abstract

After explaining what moral relativism is, Mark Timmons gives three arguments against the view. He then proceeds to contrast moral relativism with what he calls the "context sensitivity thesis" and the "moral diversity thesis." He speculates that those who say they are moral relativists often have in mind one of these other theses that does not commit one to moral relativism. He ends with remarks about moral tolerance.

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Mark Timmons
University of Arizona

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