Abstract

In the European philosophical tradition, there are two trends in the understanding of freedom – the negative concept of freedom, which grew out of the mechanicism of the 17th century, which formed the basis of the liberal political tradition, and the con­cept of freedom as autonomy, established in a modern form in the works of Benedict Spinoza and Immanuel Kant, and later becoming the basis of the Republican politi­cal tradition. Historically, the negative concept of freedom has assumed a dominant position, in certain periods completely replacing all alternatives. However, the appeal to the idea of freedom as a state of autonomy can become one of the significant ap­proaches to critique of the liberal understanding of freedom, way of understanding its limitations. The historical analysis of the formation of the liberal concept of freedom al­lows us to identify those features of it that prevent this conceptualization of freedom from fully comprehending all forms of external influence leading to a state of unfree­dom. These include, in particular, the limited understanding of interference in free choice, characteristic of liberalism due to the spirit of mechanicism embedded in it at the early stages of its development. This limitation in the liberal concept of freedom can be identified by referring to the Republican tradition of understanding freedom that inherited its definition of freedom from the legal tradition of Antiquity and postulates the need for the absence of not only arbitrary interference in an individual’s free choice, but also the very possibility of such an interference (something that is allowed in some forms of liberalism). At the same time, the appeal to the concept of autonomy in the form of a comparative analysis of the republican understanding of freedom and freedom as autonomy allows us to reveal the limitations of the republican understanding of free­dom, the reliance on which does not allow us to consider the external restrictions of freedom associated with the inculcation of certain values and their subsequent inter­nalization.