The Consequences of Incompatibilism

In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Incompatibilism about responsibility and determinism is sometimes directly construed as the thesis that if we found out that determinism is true, we would have to give up the reactive attitudes.  Call this "the consequence". I argue that this is a mistake: the strict modal thesis does not entail the consequence.  First, some incompatibilists (who are also libertarians) may be what we might call *resolute responsibility theorists* (or "flip-floppers").  On this view, if we found out that determinism is true, this would not be to find out that no one is responsible; instead, what this would suggest is that incompatibilism is after all false.  Second, some incompatibilists may instead deny the claim that if we found out that no one deserves the reactiveattitudes, we would have to give up the reactive attitudes.  Call this position *innocent incompatibilism*. I explore several different reasons why the fact that no one deserves the reactive attitudes likely does not translate into a requirement for us to give up the reactive attitudes.  The upshot: incompatibilism may be practically irrelevant, even if true.  

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-03-15

Downloads
697 (#38,380)

6 months
215 (#14,753)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Patrick Todd
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Resisting the epistemic argument for compatibilism.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1743-1767.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Indicative conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
4. Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme.Gary Watson - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 119-148.

View all 21 references / Add more references