Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255 (2015)
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Abstract

Many philosophers believe that judgments about propositional attitudes, or about which mental states are expressed by which sentences, are normative judgments. If this is so, then metanormative expressivism must be given expressivist treatment. This might seem to make expressivism self-defeating or worrisomely circular, or to frustrate the explanatory ambitions central to the view. I argue that recent objections along these lines to giving an expressivist account of expressivism are not successful. I shall also suggest that in order to deal with these worries, Dreier's influential response to the so-called ‘problem of creeping minimalism’ must be slightly revised

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Author's Profile

Teemu Toppinen
Tampere University

Citations of this work

Solving the problem of creeping minimalism.Matthew Simpson - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):510-531.
What is Global Expressivism?Matthew Simpson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):140-161.
How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.

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The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.

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