An a priori solution to the replication crisis

Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1188-1214 (2018)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTPossibly, the replication crisis constitutes the most important problem in psychology. It calls into question whether psychology is a science. Existing conceptualizations of replicability depend on effect sizes; the larger the population effect size, the greater the probability of replication. This is problematic and contributes to the replication crisis. A different conceptualization, not dependent on population effect sizes, is desirable. The proposed solution features the closeness of sample means to their corresponding population means, in both the original and replication experiments. If the researcher has specified the sampling precision desired, it is possible to calculate the probability of replication, prior to data collection, and without dependence on the population effect size or expected population effect size. In addition, it is not necessary to know population means or standard deviations, nor sample means or standard deviations, to employ the proposed a priori way of thinking about...

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