Specific Mechanisms versus General Theories in the Classification of Disorders

Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 4 (1):16-17 (2011)
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Abstract

Oulis pointed out that there is a great deal of interest in specific mechanisms relating to mental disorders and that these mechanisms should play a role in classification. Although specific mechanisms are important, more attention should be given to general theories. The following example from Salmon illustrates the difference.

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Citations of this work

Searching for the lost meaning.Paola Gaetano - 2011 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 4 (2):27-30.

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References found in this work

Causality and explanation.Wesley C. Salmon - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Nature and main kinds of psychopathological mechanisms.Panagiotis Oulis - 2010 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 3 (2):27-34.
The Implications of Meaning for the Validity of Diagnostic Categories.David Trafimow - 2010 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 3 (1):23-24.

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