Soul, mind – brain, body – what makes us the same?

Scientia et Fides 5 (2):107-126 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The question whether I am the same person at different moments has brought many difficulties for a long time. The problem with identity of things through time was already known in the ancient times especially when Plutarch asked whether a ship of Theseus with exchanged elements is still the same ship as before renovation. Today, we continue these considerations asking, for instance, if things, apart from their physical parts, also have temporal parts. The number of the proposed solutions to the problem of identity and identity of persons at different times resembles wandering in a dark room with a scarf on your eyes. As a result, rather than coming closer to the light switch, we find concepts which suggest that personal identity is not important, or what is important is psychological continuity or identity which is only a matter of degree. So I can be the same person as I was in some part, in some degree. It sounds like a constitution person who likes darkness and does not need light anymore. Unfortunately, first of all, we still use successfully the concept of identity in an ordinary language, and what is more, the abandonment of the notion of personal identity results in a greater number of absurdities, so in consequence, we still do not have an idea how to treat personal identity.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,937

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-01-04

Downloads
40 (#561,410)

6 months
11 (#345,260)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rafal Tryscien
University of Lodz

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Problem of Knowledge.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1956 - New York,: Harmondsworth.
Personal identity and memory.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1959 - Journal of Philosophy 56 (October):868-902.
Thought experiments and personal identity.Stephen Coleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):51-66.
Personal Identity and Survival.John Robinson - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (6):319.

Add more references