Abstract

The author presents an ethical theory which, as he admits, has much in common with the theories of M. Cohen, R. Sellars, H. Feigl, C. Lamont, and G. Williams. His first task is to define the scientific world view on which his ethical conclusions will be based. It comprises the following suppositions, logically derived from and justified by scientific practice: there is a real world independent of the knower, natural events are uniform, every event is related to some other events, everything is in constant change, all changes are orderly, causes are efficient not final. Before the good life can be defined, science must define human nature, i.e., man's basic and universal needs, which are: physical health, recognition, love, excitement and novelty, knowledge. The good life must satisfy all these needs, but since this may be done improperly, a condition must be added: that satisfaction must come from a real adjustment to the environment in the long run. Moral rules must be both happiness-producing and life-promoting. This framework allows for diversity in moral codes. Determinism does not conflict with morality, for the only freedom that morality presupposes is the absence of external or irrational causes. An act is free to the extent that it is determined by the agent's self-knowledge. The book ends with a brief discussion of the problems of overpopulation, pollution, and world-scale planning.--T. D. Z.