Function, Dysfunction, and the Concept of Mental Disorder

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):371-375 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Naturalistic accounts of mental disorder aim to identify an objective basis for attributions of mental disorder. This goal is important for demarcating genuine mental disorders from artificial or socially constructed disorders. The articulation of a demarcation criterion provides a means for assuring that attributions of 'mental disorder' are not merely pathologizing different forms of social deviance. The most influential naturalistic and hybrid definitions of mental disorder identify biological dysfunction as the objective basis of mental disorders: genuine mental...

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Philosophy of Psychiatry.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2021 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
On the nature of mental disorder: towards an objectivist account.Panagiotis Oulis - 2012 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (5):343-357.
The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder.Dominic Murphy & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):241-252.
Brain dysfunction without function.Harriet Fagerberg - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):570-582.
Naturalist accounts of mental disorder.Elselijn Kingma - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton, The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 363.
Why Mental Disorders are not Like Software Bugs.Harriet Fagerberg - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (4):661-682.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-07-21

Downloads
1,341 (#13,642)

6 months
234 (#12,591)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Y. Tsou
University of Texas at Dallas

Citations of this work

The Contrast Class for Madness and Mental Disorder.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2023 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 30 (4):323-325.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.

View all 16 references / Add more references