Autonomy, De Facto And De Jure

Abstract

On a standard philosophical conception, being autonomous is roughly equivalent to having some particular natural capacity. This paper provides argues that this conception is incorrect, or at least incomplete. The first chapter suggests that adopting an alternative conception of autonomy promises to resolve to several objections to the metaethical constitutivism, and so promises to provide highly desirable theory of moral reasons. The second chapter first motivates a broadly Kantian account of autonomous action, and then gives reasons to think that Kant's own development of this theory runs into damaging action-theoretic problems. The way to address these problems, I argue, is to modify Kant's account of autonomy in a way that leaves no room for the standard conception of autonomy to do any work.

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Paul Tulipana
University of California, Los Angeles

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Freedom Within Reason.Susan Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.

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