Abstract

It is a commonplace that philosophical doctrines, like old soldiers, are not vanquished, but merely fade away. It might have been added that, like old soldiers, they occasionally return. What is sound in the commonplace, aside from whatever merit it may have as sociological comment, is found in its underscoring the peculiarities of philosophical refutation. Did Aristotle refute Plato? Did Ockham refute Scotus? Did Reid refute Locke? Did Moore refute Bradley? Did Strawson refute Russell? Part of what I wish to show in this paper is that there are ways of posing questions like these so that they are at least answerable; it is not, however, so to pose them, much less to answer them. My chief concern is with the fact that one of the peculiarities of philosophical refutation is that it commonly contains a metaphilosophical component. Indeed, after considerable stage-setting, I shall argue that some important doctrines of Linguistic Analysts and Phenomenologists rest upon metaphilosophical mistakes and that, even where some of their doctrines are sound, the intellectual ambiance in which they are placed invites confusion. It is visionary to expect the ending of the intellectual embarrassment constituted by the coming and going of philosophical styles and fads; the attempt to expose metaphilosophical mistakes and confusions may, nevertheless, help to wither the exuberant cynicism of the commonplace.