Abstract

This article focuses on Nietzsche’s critique of the moral ideal of forgiveness and explores the idea of active forgetting as a possible alternative to this ideal. It situates Nietzsche’s critique against the background of a substantial body of work which has grown around the more general question of unconditional and conditional forgiving. I examine Nietzsche’s concept of active forgetting in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (1874) and in On the Genealogy of Morality (1887). In both texts Nietzsche addresses the question of how nations and individuals relate to their past and argues that a healthy psyche, of nations as of individuals, requires the ability to relieve ourselves of the burden of the past. I suggest that, while what Nietzsche calls active forgetting is a natural endowment of the human being, albeit suppressed by the abundance of memory, it can also be thought of as an ethical principle in its own right.