Inverted earth, swampman, and representationalism

Philosophical Perspectives 12:459-78 (1998)
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10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.20

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reprint Tye, Michael (1998) "Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism". Noûs 32(S12):459-477

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