Abstract

Sāṃkhya, in its commentary Yuktidīpikā, responds to the Buddhist claim that a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and a valid cognition (pramā), its result (phala), are identical. The response of Sāṃkhya was pioneering: it is one of the two earliest responses to the Buddhists in the lively polemic on the relationship between a pramāṇa and its result. (The other of these two earliest responses is in the Ślokavārttika by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.) Sāṃkhya’s voice in this polemic is earlier than that of Nyāya, which is, as well as Mīmāṃsā, the main rival of the Buddhists in addressing this issue. This study provides a translation and detailed reconstruction of the Yuktidīpikā’s polemic with the Buddhist opponent, which has not been researched before, as well as a critical assessment of the Sāṃkhya position. The Yuktidīpikā polemicizes against Dignāga. It aptly questions the standpoint of the Buddhist opponent and presents an alternative standpoint, contrasting its own view with that of the opponent. Though the Sāṃkhya position formulated in the Yuktidīpikā evokes several critical remarks, the Yuktidīpikā’s response is an important contribution to Indian thought.