Abstract

There is no need to prove the significance to philosophy of the famous liar paradox. Attempts to solve it have not ceased over the course of many centuries, from hoary antiquity to our own day. The failure of attempts undertaken within the bounds of everyday, natural languages has led many philosophers, particularly of the positivist trend, to pessimistic conclusions with respect to the potentials of such languages. This is very clearly evident, for example, in the statement of A. Tarski, who writes: "The liar paradox made its first appearance in our discussions as a kind of evil force possessed of great destructive energy. It compels us to reject all attempts to explicate the notion of truth for natural languages and to confine ourselves to the formalized languages of scientific reasoning." Tarski's viewpoint has been repeatedly criticized. We should prefer not to cast doubt on the significance of that highly valuable criticism. However, we cannot fail to observe that Tarski's notion retains its force so long as its basic argument - the insolubility of the liar paradox within the confines of natural languages - remains standing