Analyticity by Way of Presumption

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):435 - 452 (1982)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Given a descriptive word, what is the nature of the relation between it and the features of the object to which it is supposed to apply? What is it that entitles one to assert ‘this is a horse’?A traditional answer has been in terms of ‘Merkmal’: a collection of features, or properties, severally necessary and Jointly sufficient for the application of the word in question. This relation - call it the Merkmal relation - between word and features is common to a variety of theories of meaning that may otherwise be in disagreement about the status of the features themselves in their relation to the object: whether they be actual or believed, perceptual or ‘essential,’ phenomenal or ‘real,’ etc.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,937

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reconsidering Some Passages in Wittgenstein.Frank B. Ebersole - 1972 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1 - 28.
Words and Terms.Humphrey Palmer - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (235):71 - 82.
The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
The essence of reference.R. M. Sainsbury - 2006 - In Ernest LePore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Essential vs. Accidental Properties.Teresa Robertson & Philip Atkins - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The variation problem.Ashley Feinsinger - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):317-338.
What Is a Natural Property?James Cargile - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (248):137 - 158.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
92 (#228,313)

6 months
13 (#257,195)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Avishai Margalit
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Citations of this work

Bentham on Presumed Offences.Frederick Schauer - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (4):363-379.
Rethinking the presumption of atheism.Keith Burgess-Jackson - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1):93-111.
On the strength of presumptions.Petar Bodlović - 2022 - Pragmatics and Cognition 29 (1):82-110.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
From a Logical Point of View.Richard M. Martin - 1955 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (4):574-575.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Noûs 11 (4):421-430.
Thought.Gilbert Harman & Laurence BonJour - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):256.

View all 11 references / Add more references