Abstract

In a well-known way, Husserl's foundation of phenomenology as a transcendental discipline aspires to universal essences, but collapses back to a form of Euro-centrism. While Žižek's description of the phenomenology of the subject follows the Husserlian line in that the subject is a transcendental structure of experience, it is intended to be interpreted in a materialist sense: there is no Big Other. This materialist twist to the philosophy of the subject is supposed to eliminate two traditional phenomenological dead-ends: the Husserlian mistake of colonialism masquerading as universalism and the post-phenomenological mistake of not being able to take an existential and political stand seriously enough. These mistakes are overcome through the notion of a materialist act that is able to reorganize the given boundaries of a situation. However, as Žižek limits his phenomenology of the act to a communicative transaction between subjects, he is quite close to the Husserlian mistake of promoting European values as universal. This can be seen in a number of conceptual knots that figure in Žižek's work. First, like Husserl, Žižek is unable to satisfactorily bridge the divide between transcendental knowledge and positive science. Second, the Žižekian analysis of the necessary political action against multiculturalist capitalism emphatically belittles the role of local and ethnic identities as revolutionary forces. Correspondingly, the belief in the revolutionary potential of the psychoanalytically and philosophically enlightened subject is over-optimistic. Third, the phenomenology of the act in an unfortunate way describes the transcendental aspect of an authentic act, thus unnecessarily mystifying the essentially mundane and subject-less nature of revolutionary acts