Is Luck Capabilitarianism Possible?

Éthique Et Économique 15 (1) (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Capability theorists claim that real freedoms should constitute the informational basis for assessing individual wellbeing. Nevertheless, they have not yet developed a normative theory of social justice accounting for why or under what circumstances a political community has the obligation to mitigate deficits in real freedoms. This paper examines whether combining Luck Egalitarianism principles with capabilities as a metric of advantage can deliver an acceptable solution to this problem. However, in light of its inconsistency with the core claims found in capability literature, this paper ultimately rejects that possibility for two reasons: First, because it disregards the multidimensional character of the metric. Second, because it undermines the notion that capabilities are valuable not just because they represent positive freedom but because of the beings and doings they enable.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,601

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-10-04

Downloads
11 (#1,434,156)

6 months
2 (#1,700,851)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references