A Modal Argument for lncompatibilism

In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame

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