Abstract

This paper argues for the claim that belief is involuntary. Evidence in favour of it comes from various thought experiments. However, other thought experiments might be taken to indicate that belief is not involuntary (thought experiments regarding such policies as the policy to consider only evidence in favour of a claim and to neglect contrary evidence, or the policy to join a group of believers in a claim, or the policy to apply some form of self-suggestion). It is argued that none of these thought experiments should lead one to reject the main claim of this paper. Some evidence from empirical psychology, viz. the evidence in favour of the phenomenon of “motivated reasoning”, may be thought to undermine some of my arguments in favour of the claim that belief is involuntary. It is argued that this is not the case. Some other type of evidence from psychology, viz. the evidence related to the unconscious, by contrast, may be thought to support the claim that belief is involuntary. It is argued that this is only partially so.