GELOOFSVERANTWOORDING: Een discussie met „Religie en waarheid” van H. De Dijn

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (1):121 - 132 (1990)
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Abstract

In his article on Religion and Truth (Religie en waarheid, TvF 51/1989, p. 407-426) Herman De Dijn separates dramatically the sphere of the religious from the truth into which we can have insight. On this basis, he essentially makes the justification of faith superfluous and almost inadmissible. In this reply, it has been shown that people have the fundamental possibility, also in the area of the religious, to distinguish between illusion and reality. If one wishes to be faithful to one's humanity, then a person must try to separate the religious truth from illusion, to discover where God truly announces himself in the interpersonal and social experience. This includes the possibility of some insight into the act of believing. De Dijn states that people can live with a disconnection between one's scientific insights and one's religious convictions. On the contrary, it is argued here that the asserted disconnection is a fiction. De Dijn claims that religion has an inevitable particularity. In this article it has been indicated that there is a universality to religous reality that concerns the core of each human life. De Dijn links the religious reality with the desire for the transcendent. We emphasize, on the other hand, the central role of the God who announces himself and against whom we have to take a position. All these elements imply a cognitive element in religion and thus a relationship to a truth which is both broader than that of science, and also encompasses science

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