Abstract

This dissertation develops an interpretation of pure reflection in Sartre's early philosophy. The primary contention is that while the concept of pure reflection is not well-developed it is crucial to understanding Sartre, and that it is possible to reconstruct an understanding of pure reflection from Sartre's brief indications which is both coherent and consistent with Sartre's thought as a whole. ;Chapter one presents the concept of pure reflection as a response to a specific set of problems about reflection in Sartre's phenomenology. Reflection arises in the first instance as a problem of epistemology. The epistemological problem of reflection is translated into an ontological problem in Being and Nothingness, and on this ground becomes a problem of morality. Pure reflection represents Sartre's response to the problem on all three levels. The narrow definition of the problem of reflection suggests an equally narrow definition of pure reflection. ;Chapter two argues that pure reflection cannot be understood as a special case of the phenomenological reduction as it has sometimes been maintained, but rather requires a distinct type of consciousness which is closely related to Sartre's view of conception in The Psychology of Imagination. Likewise, pure reflection is not arrived at through abstraction as it has also been thought, but must immediately deliver consciousness to itself without an object. On the basis of these considerations, it is argued that pure reflection is on the one hand identical to the experience of anguish and on the other represents a reflective thematization of the pre-reflective cogito. ;Chapters three and four present the case that this reflective thematization is analogous to the notions of "intuition" in Bergson and "understanding" in Jaspers, respectively, which reflects a direct and substantial influence of Bergson and Jaspers on Sartre's thought that is often overlooked. ;Chapter five develops the implications of this interpretation for Sartre's ethical theory, maintaining that the concept of authenticity is rendered more intelligible and that Sartre's understanding of moral judgment as a consequence avoids several of the serious objections that have been raised against his theory