Conflicts between Basic Rights and Balancing

Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 54:111-117 (2018)
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Abstract

The notion that the application of basic rights requires “balancing” is widely and increasingly accepted. Balancing judgments are ever more frequently used in judicial decisions, particularly in constitutional courts and especially in contemporary supra-national human-rights courts. Many jurists deem that balancing is the only possible method to arrive to a rational decision in cases of conflict between basic rights. I assert that this kind of conflict between principles has the same structure of moral conflicts. And, as is the case with moral conflicts, the way conflicts are solved will depend on the underlying concept of practical reasoning. I describe the two basic patterns that practical reasoning may follow in situations of conflict between moral principles in general and argue against the idea that balancing is the most appropriate procedure to cope with the conflict, either in general terms or in juridical argumentation in particular.

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Marina Velasco
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

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