Abstract

‘Narrativity and Hermeneutics’ is not an obvious subject to mark the fifth anniversary of a centre devoted to applied ethics. Narrative tradition and the interpretation of texts are not the main concern of handbooks on biomedical ethics, engineering ethics, business ethics or ecological ethics. The reasons are evident; most practitioners of applied ethics see their area of research as a functionally differentiated discipline, a carefully circumscribed field wherein only specialists are competent. In their textbooks they adopt the view of ethical expertise as defended by Theo van Willingenburg in his noteworthy thesis Inside the Ethical Expert. According to this view, practitioners of applied ethics are experts possessing a body of specialized knowledge and skill within a given domain acquired through a substantial amount of study and training. Besides being able to clarify problems and analyze concepts and arguments, they are, as experts, also able to apply specific skills of moral reasoning to reach a substantiated evaluation of values and norms, with the ultimate purpose of offering suitable ethical advice.The acquisition of a certain amount of expertise is doubtless important. The practice of applied ethics is more than probing for a good moral intention. They primarily pursue the right moral choice, i.e. the action that in a given, often complex situation, is objectively suitable to express a good moral intention. A right moral choice is impossible without a thorough clarification of the complex reality about which a moral judgment must be made.Yet emphasizing ethical expertise does not say everything. Is it correct to position ethicists as experts parallel to the medical, economic or technical experts with whom they deal? Does applied ethics, because of its functionally differentiated approach, not run the risk of either reducing itself to a professional deontology with a limited view of responsibility or enclosing itself with other experts in an iron cage of technocratic, bureaucratic or instrumental rationality? When forming an ethical judgment, is it possible to exclude completely all influence arising from personal convictions?