The Relevance of a Relevantly Assertable Disjunction for Material Implication

Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (3):339-366 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper Grice's requirements for assertability are imposed on the disjunction of Classical Logic. Defining material implication in terms of negation and disjunction supplemented by assertability conditions, results in the disappearance of the most important paradoxes of material implication. The resulting consequence relation displays a very strong resemblance to Schurz's conclusion-relevant consequence relation.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,174

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Relevance Logic.Edwin D. Mares - 2002 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic. Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 607–627.
Defending a simple theory of conditionals.Adam Rieger - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):253-260.
Material Implication Revisited.Joseph S. Fulda - 1989 - American Mathematical Monthly 96 (3):247-250.
Material implication and general indicative conditionals.Stephen Barker - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):195-211.
On the role of implication in formal logic.Jonathan Seldin - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (3):1076-1114.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
115 (#187,289)

6 months
8 (#594,873)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Neccessity, Vol. I.Alan Ross Anderson & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Edited by Nuel D. Belnap & J. Michael Dunn.
Proof theory.K. Schütte - 1977 - New York: Springer Verlag.

View all 13 references / Add more references