Understanding and how-possibly explanations: Why can’t they be friends?

Philosophical Studies 182 (1):355-368 (2025)
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Abstract

In the current debate on the relation between how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and understanding, two seemingly irreconcilable positions have emerged, which either deny or assert HPEs’ contribution to understanding. We argue, in contrast, that there is substantial room for reconciliation between these positions. First, we show that a shared assumption is unfounded: HPEs can be interpreted as being correct explanations. Second, we argue that what we call the standard account is actually compatible with the claim that HPEs may improve understanding. Our analysis not only indicates that there is room for reconciliation, but also specifies the potential remaining disagreements.

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Author Profiles

Philippe Verreault-Julien
Eindhoven University of Technology
Till Grüne-Yanoff
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

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