Psychometrics versus Representational Theory of Measurement

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (4-5):330-350 (2017)
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Abstract

Erik Angner has argued that simultaneous endorsement of the representational theory of measurement and psychometrics leads to inconsistency. His claim rests on an implicit assumption: RTM and psychometrics are full-fledged approaches to measurement. I argue that RTM and psychometrics are only partial approaches that deal with different aspects of measurement, and that therefore simultaneous endorsement of the two is not inconsistent. The argument has implications for the improvement of measurement practices.

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Citations of this work

Valid for What? On the Very Idea of Unconditional Validity.Cristian Larroulet Philippi - 2020 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 51 (2):151–175.
The Complementarity of Psychometrics and the Representational Theory of Measurement.Elina Vessonen - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):415-442.
Operationalism and realism in psychometrics.Elina Vessonen - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (10):e12624.
How the case against empathy overreaches.Riana J. Betzler - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.

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