A Defence of Fregean Propositions

Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 26 (2006)
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Abstract

Stephen Schiffer 2003 presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions are the referents of that-clauses and structured entities made out of concepts. Schiffer advances an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is to argue in favour of the main tenets of the Fregean model by countering each of Schiffer’s arguments and sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic components of propositions.

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Citations of this work

Concept Designation.Arvid Båve - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):331-344.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The things we mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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