Verbalismus, Epistemizismus und die Debatte um personale Identität

Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 77 (4):484-504 (2023)
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Abstract

It is a startling fact that, despite its long and rich history, the debate about per- sonal identity is far from settled. The present paper examines two deflationary explanations for this: a) the dispute is merely verbal (verbalism); b) there cannot be sufficient justification for preferring one theory of personal identity over the others (epistemicism). As this paper argues, there is evidence that either verba- lism or epistemicism provides a correct account of the personal identity debate.

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Viktoria Knoll
Technische Universität Dresden

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References found in this work

Survival and identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty, The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
The self and the future.Bernard Williams - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (2):161-180.
The phenomenal self.Barry Dainton - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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