Abstract

Hannah Arendt's theory of political action is widely regarded as a synthesis of Aristotelian and Kantian sources. Although she clearly appropriated the praxis/poiesis distinction in its classical form and was greatly influenced by Kantian definition of freedom as autonomy and spontaneity, such a traditional genealogy fails to account for existential supremacy Arendt allotted to politics as an activity. I suggest Arendt's theory is best viewed as a product of a dialectic with Heidegger's notion of disclosure: this context allows us to appreciate her emphasis on initiatory and revelatory capacity of political action, the fact that it, more than any other activity, is meaning-creative. In Chapter 1, I show violent nature of Arendt's appropriation of praxis and examine her critique of Aristotle's teleology and instrumentalism. Chapter 2 evaluates her debt to Kant in light of her argument that will is an essentially antipolitical faculty. Contra Kant, Arendt holds freedom or autonomy of action is not grounded in subject. Instead, she defines freedom as a non-sovereign, disclosive spontaneity, a spontaneity wholly rooted in realm of appearances. This conception leads her to develop what I call an "aesthetic of action" and to draw upon Kant's aesthetics rather than his practical philosophy . Chapter 4 concludes Arendt has radically displaced concept of action and resituates her theory in context provided by Being and Time, with particular attention to concepts of disclosure, being-in-the-world, authenticity, and fallenness. I argue Heidegger's categories structure Arendt's "disclosive" theory of political action and his ontological concerns are inseparable from authentic politics as Arendt conceives it. In Chapter 5 I turn to Arendt and Heidegger's respective criticisms of modernity in order to further elucidate connection between Arendtian politics and "thought of Being." I conclude, in Chapter 6, by considering Arendt's critique of Heidegger. Arendt maintains Heidegger, like the tradition, privileges vita contemplativa over vita activa, and so remains hostile to realm of human affairs. I suggest this criticism rests on a misreading of Heidegger's later thought, one which fails to appreciate full implications of his deconstruction of the "metaphysics of presence.".