Abstract

This paper evaluates Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of pairing in light of a representative variety of findings and views in contemporary developmental psychology. This notion belongs to the direct social perception framework, which suggests that the fundamental access to other minds is intuitive, or perceptual. Pairing entails that the perception of other minds relies merely on first-person embodied experience and domain-general processes. For this reason, pairing is opposed to cognitive nativist views that assume specialized mechanisms for low-level mental state attribution, while it is compatible with acknowledging innate affective tendencies. I criticize cognitive nativism for being based on ambiguous evidence. I argue that in early social interactions infants experience sufficient self–other similarities to ground the most primitive perception of others as minded beings. I show that pairing can account for the ontogenetically earliest perceptions of others’ actions and emotions, as well as for the earliest perception of others’ perceptions.