Abstract

This is a collection of the invited papers presented at the fifth annual Oberlin Colloquium. The main papers are: "On Deductivism as a Philosophy of Science" by Stephan Körner; "Nonsense" by J. J. C. Smart; "Causing Voluntary Actions" by Joel Feinberg; "Evaluative Metaphysics" by Nicholas Rescher; and "Things and Qualities" by Herbert Hochberg. The contributions by Körner and Smart are short papers which, though well written, will offer few surprises to those familiar with their work. Körner attacks deductivist accounts of scientific explanation for failing to recognize certain crucial presuppositions in their use of logical formalisms. Smart argues that conceiving of philosophy as an attempt to eliminate nonsense from language does not, as has often been held, enable one to draw a sharp distinction between science as concerned with truth and philosophy as concerned with conceptual analysis. In the symposia which follow, Feinberg and his commentators achieve some important clarifications of the relations between causal language and the concept of voluntary action; Rescher argues, in a disappointingly laconic fashion, for the legitimacy of an evaluative metaphysics resting on the existence of distinctly metaphysical values; and Hochberg seeks to discredit traditional arguments in support of bare particulars in favor of an analysis in terms of combinations of qualities. While workmanlike throughout, this collection is of value more for the testimony it bears to a growing interest in classical philosophical themes among analytic philosophers than for any exciting theoretical advances.—V. R. M.