The depicted gaze of the Other

Rivista di Estetica 56:111-126 (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper, I first want to vindicate Wollheim’s idea that seeing-in, taken as the twofold phenomenologically sui generis experience which picture perception consists in, accounts for the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. Following Wollheim’s usage himself, by “perceptual constancy” I will mean a particular phenomenon of perceptual robustness, namely the fact that a picture’s subject is experienced as undistorted from any point of view in which a spectator may regard a picture. Moreover, I will properly take into consideration the specific impression of “being followed” by the gaze of a picture’s subject in portraits (and alike pictures), which in these cases is a consequence of perceptual constancy. For this impression corroborates a particular reading of what the seeing-in experience really consists in. According to such a reading, in the configurational fold of that experience one experiences both the merely visible surface properties and the design properties of the picture’s vehicle, where such design properties also include the so-called grouping properties of the vehicle. On the basis of such a fold, moreover, in the recognitional fold of the seeing-in experience one knowingly illusorily sees the picture as its subject.

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Alberto Voltolini
University of Turin

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References found in this work

Wollheim on pictorial representation.Jerrold Levinson - 1998 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (3):227-233.
On Gestalt-qualities.Christian Von Ehrenfels - 1937 - Psychological Review 44 (6):521-524.
Depiction, perception, and imagination: Responses to Richard Wollheim.Kendall Walton - 2002 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (1):27–35.
On Gestalt-qualities.C. V. Ehrenfels - 1937 - Psychological Review 44 (6):521-524.

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