Philosophy of Science and Information

In Luciano Floridi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Information. Routledge (2016)
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Abstract

Of all the sub-disciplines of philosophy, the philosophy of science has perhaps the most privileged relationship to information theory. This relationship has been forged through a common interest in themes like induction, probability, confirmation, simplicity, non-ad hocness, unification and, more generally, ontology. It also has historical roots. One of the founders of algorithmic information theory, Ray Solomonoff, produced his seminal work on inductive inference as a direct result of grappling with problems first encountered as a student of the influential philosopher of science Rudolf Carnap. There are other such historical connections between the two fields. Alas, there is no space to explore them here. Instead this essay will restrict its attention to a broad and accessible overview of the aforementioned common themes, which, given their nature, mandate an emphasis on AIT as opposed to general information theory.

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Ioannis Votsis
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

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References found in this work

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
The philosophy of information.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Explanation and scientific understanding.Michael Friedman - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):5-19.

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