Why specific design is not the mark of the adaptational

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):532-533 (2002)
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Abstract

Andrews et al.'s analysis suffers from a series of conceptual confusions they inherit from Gould's work. Their proposal that adaptations can be distinguished from exaptations essentially by specific design criteria fails because exaptations are often maintained and secondarily adapted by natural selection and therefore, over evolutionary time, can come to have similar levels of design specificity to adaptations.

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