Astrophysical Fine Tuning, Naturalism, and the Contemporary Design Argument

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):285-307 (2006)
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Abstract

Evidence for instances of astrophysical ‘fine tuning’ (or ‘coincidences’) is thought by some to lend support to the design argument (i.e. the argument that our universe has been designed by some deity). We assess some of the relevant empirical and conceptual issues. We argue that astrophysical fine tuning calls for some explanation, but this explanation need not appeal to the design argument. A clear and strict separation of the issue of anthropic fine tuning on one hand and any form of Eddingtonian numerology and teleology on the other, may help clarify arguably the most significant issue in the philosophy of cosmology.

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Author Profiles

Milan Cirkovic
Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade
Mark Walker
New Mexico State University

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References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The anthropic cosmological principle.John D. Barrow - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Frank J. Tipler.
Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life.David L. Hull - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):435-438.

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