Abstract

Phantasia, often misleadingly translated "imagination," is a faculty of the soul related to sense-perception, which Aristotle invokes to explain a variety of psychological phenomena. The central chapter on phantasia, De Anima III.3, gives a somewhat disconnected account of the faculty: activities as diverse as thinking, non-standard perceiving, remembering and dreaming are equally subsumed under phantasia. Aristotle also invokes phantasia to explain, in part, the movement of animals. ;Whereas Aristotle scholars of the early twentieth century considered phantasia primarily as a faculty of mental images, recent work by commentators which compares Aristotle's psychology and functionalist theory of mind seems more promising. Specifically, the thesis examines the similarity between the two using De Anima II.1 and 2 as the basis. I conclude that both positions are non-reductivist and non-materialist in nature, though acknowledging the need for some physical system in which the functional capacities are realized. ;Making use of the functionalist theory as a frame of reference, the later chapters are concerned with showing that the various contexts in which phantasia appears can be unified under a functional principle. By referring to the functional role phantasia plays within the life of the animal, the textual material becomes more consistent. In general, I find that phantasia may be seen as a faculty concerned with non-standard sense experience which operates for the survival and flourishing of the individual