Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the role of intentional idioms in psychology by analyzing the views of two American philosophers who have written extensively on the subject--W. V. Quine and Jerry A. Fodor. ;It is shown that both Quine and Fodor eschew classical reductionism and type physicalism. But it is argued that Fodor's notion of the relation of psychology to neuroscience and Quine's preference for physiology over mentalism require a commitment to some form of type physicalism. ;Methodologically, Fodor regards the use of intentional terms as a cornerstone of the functional cognitive psychology he advances. Intentional terms are not eliminated by behavioral or physiological terms. ;In contrast, Quine believes the causal explanation of human behavior will ultimately be given in terms of physiology. The employment of mental and intentional terms in psychology has at best a heuristic value for the interim. ;The dissertation favors Fodor's argument that a psychology using functional-intentional descriptions of mental states plays a fundamental role in the development of cognitive psychology. It agrees with Fodor that the notion of representation is necessary to this project. Also, it is suggested that Quine's own psychological theorizing depends on at least a modicum of functional descriptions. ;However, the dissertation holds that Quine's work--such as his thesis of indeterminacy--implies serious epistemological and methodological worries about the use of intentional idioms, even in a functional setting. ;It is argued that the concept of mental content--a central element in the analysis of intentional terms--requires further clarification if a Fodorian approach is to have a sound conceptual base. ;In addition, puzzles and problems surrounding the notion of conscious content in Fodor's philosophy of mind are examined