Abstract

There are reasons for many things. For instance, we can have reasons to watch our favorite movie and believe that it will live up to the hype. These are cases of reasons for beliefs and actions. We can also have reasons for affective attitudes: we can have reasons to be excited the movie is releasing, to fear that our friends won’t like it as much as we do, and to be relieved that they did. Barry Maguire has recently argued against the claim that there are reasons for affective attitudes. If he is right, it would have serious consequences in metaethics. Several projects in metaethics are committed to the existence of reasons for affective attitudes. These views are doomed if Maguire is right. Other projects have run into serious difficulties in trying to account for the existence of reasons for attitudes. Their prospects are seriously improved if Maguire is right. I hope to show we should not accept these consequences: the existence of reasons for attitudes can be defended against Maguire’s attack.