Abstract

In this dissertation we show that Derrida cannot "overcome" Hegel simply by contradicting the system in the name of a competing theoretical truth, for example, the "truth" that conceptuality is always inscribed in a network of linguistic differences, or the "truth" that difference should not be understood solely in terms of negativity. Such truth-claims would cause Derrida's "overcoming" to presuppose conceptual frameworks that are typical of Western metaphysics and that have already been anticipated and put into question by Hegel. Because contradicting Hegel in the name of some truth would cause Derrida's break with Hegelianism to be recouped by the latter, Derrida cedes the truth to Hegel and attempts to overcome the system by affirming it, eschewing a constative, theoretical discourse in favor of a performative discourse based on laughter, lies and game-playing. Thus while, from the viewpoint of philosophy, Derrida could be argued to be in complete agreement with Hegel, he is nonetheless able to strike new ground for his thought. We then see how this ambiguous relationship to Hegel is manifested in Glas, Derrida's most extensive engagement with Hegelianism, where he seems to imply that we will have misunderstood absolute knowledge and shown ourselves to be beholden to the kind of thinking Hegel terms Verstand, unless we become part of absolute knowledge, i.e. become complicit with Hegel in constituting it, play his game. We thus see that the game which Derrida is playing to avoid Hegelianism might also be seen to be part of a game that Derrida is playing with Hegel, and that while being the thinker to come closest to overcoming Hegel, Derrida might also be seen as the most ingenious Hegelian. The final chapter examines further our role in Hegelianism, which, because we help create its truth, cannot be understood as a set of assertions about reality, but as something more akin to a game, myth or ritual. In general, we try to show how both Derrida and Hegel philosophize from a position of immanence rather than transcendence, how both eschew truth-claims and the subject/object distinction, and how both are thus philosophers of the event