Towards a new theory of historical counterfactuals

In Pavel Arazim & Michal Dancak (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2014. College Publications. pp. 293-310 (2015)
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Abstract

We investigate the semantics of historical counterfactuals in indeterministic contexts. We claim that "plain" and "necessitated" counterfactuals differ in meaning. To substantiate this claim, we propose a new semantic treatment of historical counterfactuals in the Branching Time framework. We supplement our semantics with supervaluationist postsemantics, thanks to which we can explain away the intuitions which seem to talk in favor of the identification of "would" with "would necessarily".

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Author Profiles

Leszek Wroński
Jagiellonian University
Jacek Wawer
Jagiellonian University

References found in this work

Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world.Nuel D. Belnap - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Michael Perloff & Ming Xu.
Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.

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