Chopping up gunk

The Monist 87 (3):339-350 (2004)
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Abstract

Atomism, the view that indivisible atoms are the basic building blocks of physical reality, has a distinguished history. But it might not be true. The history of physical science certainly gives many of us pause. Every time some class of objects appeared to be the entities that Newton had described as “solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, movable Particles” out of which “God in the Beginning formed Matter,” further research revealed that these objects were divisible after all. One might be tempted to see that history as confirming Leibniz’s dismissal of atomism as a “youthful prejudice.” Perhaps material objects and their parts are always divisible. There are no extended atoms; nor are there point particles which compose material beings.

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Anaxagoras’s Qualitative Gunk.Anna Marmodoro - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (3):402-422.

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