Intuition as a Philosophical Argument

Grazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1):1-7 (1996)
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Abstract

We experience evidence, but experienced evidence does not entail objective validity of the evident content. There are different kinds of intuitive evidence: logical and analytical evidence, the presuppositions of realism etc.; there is intuitive evidence in the cognitive field as well as in the practical realm. Intuitive evidence is linked with the basic framework of the respective field. Intuition may be replaced by deeper intuition on the basis of new views that evoke a reconstruction of the framework. Value intuition is characterized as an established opinion which seems undubitable. All persons, all groups and all institutions have actually some practical convictions on which they found their practical evaluation.

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