Abstract

The connection between Adam Smith and Alasdair MacIntyre is not evident at first glance. In fact, those who know MacIntyre’s work might bristle at the association. MacIntyre is inherently anticapitalist. He believes that moral people ought to reject the modern state and large-scale corporations.1 He also rejects what he terms the enlightenment project, claiming not only that it failed but that it was doomed to do so.2 Furthermore, MacIntyre’s perspectivalism seems to run counter to any “impartial spectator” theory such as Smith ’s; tradition-bound rationality necessarily assumes partiality.3 In short, MacIntyre regards himself as an opponent of the liberal tradition, that intellectual lineage which is most closely associated with Smith, and, although he rejects association with communitarianism, he holds a similar place in contemporary philosophy. He is liberalism’s critic, not its reformer. But ethics makes strange bedfellows. MacIntyre’s theory of rationality, I contend, provides a useful and important complement to Smith ’s moral psychology. It allows for the intermingling of emotion and reason that is so important for Smith ’s work.4 It creates a structure for bridging Smith ’s individuals and the communities of which they are a part. In essence, I argue, MacIntyre’s work allows us to better understand Smith ’s jump from deliberation on the individual level to the development of cultural standards and norms. I conclude that Smith ’s emphasis on the individual results in an incomplete theory of communal rationality, and that MacIntyre’s emphasis on tradition leaves out a foundation of individual agency. The two theories, however complement each other well. As a bit of preparation, it is worth mentioning that both thinkers, and Smith, in particular, are often portrayed inaccurately. Smith is not the self-interest focused libertarian that he is made out to be. He is, instead a sophisticated moral theorist whose first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments was celebrated and influential in its time.