Transparent trust and oppression

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (1):45-64 (2013)
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Abstract

I construct an analysis of social trust that attends distinctively to cooperation in social relations that has the capability to (begin to) counter the default social distrust obtained due to oppressive conditions via a form of collective reasoning. For social trust to overcome oppression it must be a normatively transparent form of trust. Transparent trust can counter the effects of oppression on social interaction and foster social cooperation by correcting unequal positions of social vulnerability and improving disparities in credibility resultant of oppression since collective reasoning in norm legitimization permits all individuals to participate in the process of self and other defining and the development of the concomitant norms that guide these processes

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Shay Welch
Spelman College

Citations of this work

Affective injustice and fundamental affective goods.Francisco Gallegos - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (2):185-201.
Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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