Agency, Identity, and Alienation in The Sickness unto Death

In Patrick Stokes, Eleanor Helms & Adam Buben (eds.), The Kierkegaardian Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 305-316 (2019)
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Abstract

In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard describes selfhood as an achievement, specifically claiming that the self’s task ‘is to become itself’ (SUD, 29/SKS 11, 143). But how can one can become who or what one already is, and what sort of achievement is it? This chapter draws on the work of Christine Korsgaard, another philosopher who sees selfhood as an achievement, using her notion of practical identity to explore Kierkegaard’s accounts of the structure of the self and of selfhood as achievement. Kierkegaard’s treatment of selfhood—as aspirational and, if undertaken well, appropriately grounded in one’s facticity (i.e. the concrete facts of one’s situation)—suggests how consciously endorsed identities can guide (or fail to guide) our agency. Having a practical identity involves striving to inhabit adopted roles by aligning our actions with relevant normative demands, but also sometimes embracing and consciously adopting identities already tacitly guiding our engagement with the world. This framework also suggests several ways we can be alienated from desires, actions, or, more generally, our selves. Putting Kierkegaard in conversation with contemporary agency theory, this chapter has two guiding lines of inquiry. First, what does it mean to achieve selfhood and how can the notion of practical identity illuminate or be illuminated by this question? Second, how can this analysis clarify the experience of not being oneself, whether resulting from self-deception, self-ignorance, or the potentially frustrating gap between who one is and who one wants to be?

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Justin F. White
Brigham Young University

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References found in this work

Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1982 - In Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Self to Self.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):39-76.
The Naked Self: Kierkegaard and Personal Identity.Patrick Stokes - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
Being and existence in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works.John W. Elrod - 1975 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

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